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FIRST-ORDER LOGIC IN THE MEDVEDEV LATTICE
RUTGER KUYPER
Abstract. Kolmogorov introduced an informal calculus of problems in an
attempt to provide a classical semantics for intuitionistic logic. This was
later formalised by Medvedev and Muchnik as what has come to be called
the Medvedev and Muchnik lattices. However, they only formalised this for
propositional logic, while Kolmogorov also discussed the universal quantifier.
We extend the work of Medvedev to first-order logic, using the notion of a
first-order hyperdoctrine from categorical logic, to a structure which we will
call the hyperdoctrine of mass problems. We study the intermediate logic that
the hyperdoctrine of mass problems gives us, and we study the theories of
subintervals of the hyperdoctrine of mass problems in an attempt to obtain an
analogue of Skvortsova’s result that there is a factor of the Medvedev lattice
characterising intuitionistic propositional logic. Finally, we consider Heyting
arithmetic in the hyperdoctrine of mass problems and prove an analogue of
Tennenbaum’s theorem on computable models of arithmetic.
1. Introduction
In [10], Kolmogorov introduced an interpretation of intuitionistic logic through
the use of problems (or Aufgaben). In this paper, he argued that proving a formula
in intuitionistic logic is very much like solving a problem. The exact definition of
a problem is kept informal, but he does define the necessary structure on problems
corresponding to the logical connectives. His ideas were later formalised by Medve-
dev [14] as the Medvedev lattice, and a variation of this was introduced by Muchnik
[15].
However, Medvedev andMuchnik only studied propositional logic, while Kolmogorov
also briefly discussed the universal quantifier in his paper:
“Im allgemeinen bedeutet, wenn x eine Variable (von beliebiger Art)
ist und a(x) eine aufgabe bezeichnet, deren Sinn von dem Werte
von x abha¨ngt, (x)a(x) die Aufgabe “eine allgemeine Methode fu¨r
die Lo¨sung von a(x) bei jedem einzelnen Wert von x anzugeben”.
Man soll dies so verstehen: Die aufgabe (x)a(x) zu lo¨sen, bedeutet,
imstande sein, fu¨r jeden gegebenen Einzelwert x0 von x die Aufgabe
a(x0) nach einer endlichen Reihe von im voraus (schon vor der Wahl
von x0) bekannten Schritten zu lo¨sen.”
In the English translation [11] this reads as follows:
“In the general case, if x is a variable (of any kind) and a(x) denotes
a problem whose meaning depends on the values of x, then (x)a(x)
denotes the problem “find a general method for solving the problem
a(x) for each specific value of x”. This should be understood as
follows: the problem (x)a(x) is solved if the problem a(x0) can be
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solved for each given specific value of x0 of the variable x by means
of a finite number of steps which are fixed in advance (before x0 is
set).”
It is important to note that, when Kolmogorov says that the steps should be
fixed before x0 is set, he probably does not mean that we should have one solution
that works for every x0; instead, the solution is allowed to depend on x0, but it
should do so uniformly. This belief is supported by one of the informal examples of
a problem he gives: “given one solution of ax2+bx+c = 0, give the other solution”.
Of course there is no procedure to transform one solution to the other one which
does not depend on the parameters a, b and c; however, there is one which does so
uniformly. More evidence can be found in Kolmogorov’s discussion of the law of the
excluded middle, where he says that a solution of the problem ∀a(a∨¬a), where a
quantifies over all problems, should be “a general method which for any problem a
allows one either to find its solution or to derive a contradiction from the existence
of such a solution” and that “unless the reader considers himself omniscient, he
will perhaps agree that [this formula] cannot be in the list of problems that he has
solved”. In other words, a solution of ∀a(a∨ ¬a) should be a solution of a∨¬a for
every problem a which is allowed to depend on a, and it should be uniform because
we are not omniscient.
In this paper, we will formalise this idea in the spirit of Medvedev. To do this,
we will use the notion of a first-order hyperdoctrine from categorical logic, which
naturally extends the notion of Brouwer algebras used to give algebraic semantics
for propositional intuitionistic logic, to first-order intuitionistic logic. We will give a
short overview of the necessary definitions and properties in section 2. After that, in
section 3 we will introduce the degrees of ω-mass problems, which combine the idea
of Medvedev that ‘solving’ should be interpreted as ‘computing’ with the idea of
Kolmogorov that ‘solving’ should be uniform in the variables. Using these degrees of
ω-mass problems, we will introduce the hyperdoctrine of mass problems in section
4. Next, in section 5 we study the intermediate logic which this hyperdoctrine
of mass problems gives us, and we start looking at subintervals of it to try and
obtain analogous results to Skvortsova’s [20] remarkable result that intuitionistic
propositional logic can be obtained from a factor of the Medvedev lattice. In section
6 we show that even in these intervals we cannot get every intuitionistic theory,
by showing that there is an analogue of Tennenbaum’s theorem [22] that every
computable model of Peano arithmetic is the standard model. Finally, in section 7
we prove a partial positive result on which theories can be obtained in subintervals
of the hyperdoctrine of mass problems, through a characterisation using Kripke
models.
Recently, Basu and Simpson [2] have independently studied an interpretation
of higher-order intuitionistic logic based on the Muchnik lattice. One of the main
differences between our approach and their approach is that our approach follows
Kolmogorov’s philosophy that the interpretation of the universal quantifier should
depend uniformly on the variable. On the other hand, in their approach, depend-
ing on the view taken either the interpretation does not depend on the quantified
variable at all or does so non-uniformly (as we will discuss below in Remark 2.4).
Of course, an important advantage of their approach is that it is suitable for higher-
order logic, while we can only deal with first-order logic. Another important differ-
ence between our work and theirs is that we start from the Medvedev lattice, while
they take the Muchnik lattice as their starting point.
Our notation is mostly standard. We let ω denote the natural numbers and ωω
the Baire space of functions from ω to ω. We denote concatenation of strings σ
and τ by σ⌢τ . For functions f, g ∈ ωω we denote by f ⊕ g the join of the functions
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f and g, i.e. (f ⊕ g)(2n) = f(n) and (f ⊕ g)(2n + 1) = g(n). We let 〈a1, . . . , an〉
denote a fixed computable bijection between ωn and ω. For any set A ⊆ ωω we
denote by A its complement in ωω. When we say that a set is countable, we include
the possibility that it is finite. We denote the join operation in lattices by ⊕ and
the meet operation in lattices by ⊗. A Brouwer algebra is a bounded distributive
lattice together with an implication operation → such that x ⊕ y ≥ z if and only
if y ≥ x → z. For unexplained notions from computability theory, we refer to
Odifreddi [16], for the Muchnik and Medvedev lattices, we refer to the surveys of
Sorbi [21] and Hinman [6], for lattice theory, we refer to Balbes and Dwinger [1],
and finally for unexplained notions about Kripke semantics we refer to Chagrov
and Zakharyaschev [3] and Troelstra and van Dalen [23].
2. Categorical semantics for IQC
In this section we will discuss the notion of first-order hyperdoctrine, as formu-
lated by Pitts [17], based on the important notion of hyperdoctrine introduced by
Lawvere [13]. These first-order hyperdoctrines can be used to give sound and com-
plete categorical semantics for IQC (intuitionistic first-order logic). Our notion of
first-order logic in the Medvedev lattice will be based on this, so we will discuss the
basic definitions and the basic properties before we proceed with our construction.
We use the formulation from Pitts [19] (but we use Brouwer algebras instead of
Heyting algebras, because the Medvedev lattice is normally presented as a Brouwer
algebra).
Let us first give the definition of a first-order hyperdoctrine. After that we will
discuss an easy example and discuss how first-order hyperdoctrines interpret first-
order intuitionistic logic. We will not discuss all details and the full motivation
behind this definition, instead referring the reader to the works by Pitts [17, 19].
However, we will discuss some of the motivation behind this definition in Remark
2.9 below.
Definition 2.1. ([19, Definition 2.1]) Let C be a category such that for every
object X ∈ C and every n ∈ ω, the n-fold product Xn of X exists. A first-order
hyperdoctrine P over C is a contravariant functor P : Cop → Poset from C into
the category Poset of partially ordered sets and order homomorphisms, satisfying:
(i) For each object X ∈ C, the partially ordered set P(X) is a Brouwer algebra;
(ii) For each morphism f : X → Y in C, the order homomorphism P(f) : P(Y )→
P(X) is a homomorphism of Brouwer algebras;
(iii) For each diagonal morphism ∆X : X → X ×X in C (i.e. a morphism such
that π1 ◦ ∆X = π2 ◦ ∆X = 1X), the right adjoint to P(∆X) at the bottom
element 0 ∈ P(X) exists. In other words, there is an element =X ∈ P(X×X)
such that for all A ∈ P(X ×X) we have
P(∆X)(A) ≤ 0 if and only if A ≤ =X .
(iv) For each product projection π : Γ ×X → Γ in C, the order homomorphism
P(π) : P(Γ) → P(Γ × X) has both a right adjoint (∃x)Γ and a left adjoint
(∀x)Γ, i.e.:
P(π)(B) ≤ A if and only if B ≤ (∃x)Γ(A)
A ≤ P(π)(B) if and only if (∀x)Γ(A) ≤ B.
Moreover, these adjoints are natural in Γ, i.e. given s : Γ→ Γ′ in C we have
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P(Γ′ ×X)
P(s×1X )
//
(∃x)Γ′

P(Γ×X)
(∃x)Γ

P(Γ′)
P(s)
// P(Γ)
P(Γ′ ×X)
P(s×1X )
//
(∀x)Γ′

P(Γ×X)
(∀x)Γ

P(Γ′)
P(s)
// P(Γ).
This condition is called the Beck-Chevalley condition.
We will also denote P (f) by f∗.
Remark 2.2. We emphasise that the adjoints (∃x)Γ and (∀x)Γ only need to be
order homomorphisms, and that they do no need to preserve the lattice structure.
This should not come as a surprise: after all, the universal quantifier does not dis-
tribute over logical disjunction, and neither does the existential quantifier distribute
over conjunction.
Example 2.3. ([19, Example 2.2]) Let B be a complete Brouwer algebra. Then
B induces a first-order hyperdoctrine P over the category Set of sets and func-
tions as follows. We let P(X) be BX , which is again a Brouwer algebra under
coordinate-wise operations. Furthermore, for each function f : X → Y we let P(f)
be the function which sends (By)y∈Y to the set given by Ax = Bf(x). The equality
predicates =X are given by
=X(x, z) =
{
0 if x = z
1 otherwise.
For the adjoints we use the fact that B is complete: given B ∈ P(Γ×X) we let
((∀x)Γ(B))γ =
⊕
x∈X
B(γ,x)
and
((∃x)Γ(B))γ =
⊗
x∈X
B(γ,x).
Then P is directly verified to be a first-order hyperdoctrine.
Remark 2.4. A special case of Example 2.3 is when we take B to be the Muchnik
lattice. In that case we obtain a fragment of the first-order part of the structure
studied by Basu and Simpson [2] mentioned in the introduction. Let us consider
Γ = {∅} and X = ω. Thus, if we have a sequence of problems B(∅,0),B(∅,1), . . .
(which we will write as B0,B1, . . . ), we have
(∀x)Γ((Bi)i∈ω) =
⊕
i∈ω
Bi = {f ∈ ω
ω | ∀i ∈ ω∃g ∈ Bi(f ≥T g)} ,
in other words a solution of the problem ∀x(B(x)) computes a solution of every Bi
but does so non-uniformly.
If, as in [2], we take each Bi to be the canonical representative of its Muchnik
degree, i.e. we take Bi to be upwards closed under Turing reducibility, then we have
that
(∀x)Γ((Bi)i∈ω) =
⊕
i∈ω
Bi =
⋂
i∈ω
Bi,
i.e. a solution of the problem ∀x(B(x)) is a single solution that solves every Bi.
Thus, depending on the view one has on the Muchnik lattice, either the solution is
allowed to depend on x but non-uniformly, or it is not allowed to depend on x at
all.
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Next, let us discuss how first-order intuitionistic logic can be interpreted in first-
order hyperdoctrines. Most of the literature on this subject deals with multi-sorted
first-order logic; however, to keep the notation easy and because we do not intend
to discuss multi-sorted logic in our particular application, we will give the definition
only for single-sorted first-order logic.
Definition 2.5. (Pitts [17, p. B2]) Let P be a first-order hyperdoctrine over C
and let Σ be a first-order language. Then a structure M for Σ in P consists of:
(i) an object M ∈ C (the universe),
(ii) a morphism JfKM :M
n →M in C for every n-ary function symbol f in Σ,
(iii) an element JRKM ∈ P(Mn) for every n-ary relation in Σ.
Case (iii) is probably the most interesting part of this definition, since it says
that elements of P(Mn) should be seen as generalised n-ary predicates on M .
Definition 2.6. ([17, Table 6.4]) Let t be a first-order term in a language Σ and
let M be a structure in a first-order hyperdoctrine P . Let ~x = (x1, . . . , xn) be a
context (i.e. an ordered list of distinct variables) containing all free variables in t.
Then we define the interpretation Jt(~x)KM ∈Mn →M inductively as follows:
(i) If t is a variable xi, then Jt(~x)KM is the projection ofM
n to the ith coordinate.
(ii) If t is f(s1, . . . , sm) for f in Σ, then Jt(~x)KM is JfKM◦(Js1(~x)KM, . . . , Jsm(~x)KM).
Thus, we identify a term with the function mapping a valuation of the variables
occurring in the term to the value of the term when evaluated at that valuation.
Definition 2.7. ([17, Table 8.2]) Let ϕ be a first-order formula in a language Σ
and let M be a structure in a first-order hyperdoctrine P . Let ~x = (x1, . . . , xn) be
a context (i.e. an ordered list of distinct variables) containing all free variables in
ϕ. Then we define the interpretation Jϕ(~x)KM ∈ P(Mn) (relative to the context ~x)
inductively as follows:
(i) If ϕ is R(t1, . . . , tm), then Jϕ(~x)KM is (Jt1(~x)KM, . . . , Jtm(~x)KM)
∗(JRKM).
(ii) If ϕ is t1 = t2, then Jϕ(~x)KM is defined as (Jt1(~x)KM, Jt2(~x)KM)
∗(=M ).
(iii) If ϕ is ⊤, then Jϕ(~x)KM is defined as 0 ∈ P(Mn); i.e. the smallest element of
P(Mn).
(iv) If ϕ is ⊥, then Jϕ(~x)KM is defined as 1 ∈ P(Mn); i.e. the largest element of
P(Mn).
(v) If ϕ is ψ ∨ θ, then Jϕ(~x)KM is defined as Jψ(~x)KM ⊗ Jθ(~x)KM.
(vi) If ϕ is ψ ∧ θ, then Jϕ(~x)KM is defined as Jψ(~x)KM ⊕ Jθ(~x)KM.
(vii) If ϕ is ψ → θ, then Jϕ(~x)KM is defined as Jψ(~x)KM → Jθ(~x)KM.
(viii) If ϕ is ∃y.ψ, then Jϕ(~x)KM is defined as (∃y)Mn(Jψ(~x, y)KM).
(ix) If ϕ is ∀y.ψ, then Jϕ(~x)KM is defined as (∀y)Mn(Jψ(~x, y)KM).
Definition 2.8. ([17, Definition 8.4]) Let ϕ be a formula in a language Σ and a
context ~x = (x1, . . . , xn), and let M be a structure in a first-order hyperdoctrine P .
Then we say that ϕ(~x) is satisfied if Jϕ(~x)KM = 0 in P(M
n). We let the theory ofM
be the set of sentences which are satisfied in the empty context, i.e. those sentences
ϕ for which ϕ(∅) is satisfied, where ∅ is the empty sequence. We denote the theory
by Th(M). Given a language Σ, we let the theory of P be the intersection of the
theories of all structures M for Σ in P , and we denote this theory by Th(P).
Remark 2.9. Let us make some remarks on the definitions given above.
• As mentioned above, we identify terms t(~x) with functions Jt(~x)KM, and m-
ary predicates R(y1, . . . , ym) are elements of P(Mn). Since we required our
category C to contain n-fold products, if we have terms t1, . . . , tm, then
(Jt1(~x)KM, . . . , Jtm(~x)KM) : M
n → Mm, so (Jt1(~x)KM, . . . , Jtm(~x)KM)∗ :
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P(Mm)→ P(Mn). This should be seen as the substitution of t1(~x), . . . , tm(~x)
for y1, . . . , ym, which explains case (i) and (ii).
• Quantifiers are interpreted as adjoints, which is an idea due to Lawvere.
For example, for the universal quantifier this says that
JψKM ≥ J∀xϕ(x)KM ⇔ Jψ(x)KM ≥ Jϕ(x)KM ,
where we assume x does not occur freely in ψ. Reading ≥ as ⊢, the two
implications are essentially the introduction and elimination rules for the
universal quantifier.
• The Beck-Chevalley condition is necessary to ensure that substitutions com-
mute with the quantifiers (modulo restrictions on bound variables).
Let us introduce a notational convention: when the structure is clear from the
context, we will omit the subscript M in J−KM. Having finished giving the definition
of first-order hyperdoctrines, let us just mention that they are sound and complete
for intuitionistic first-order logic IQC.
Proposition 2.10. ([17, Proposition 8.8]) Structures in first-order hyperdoctrines
are sound for IQC, i.e. the deductive closure of Th(M) in IQC is equal to Th(M).
Theorem 2.11. (Pitts [18, Corollary 5.31]) The class of first-order hyperdoctrines
is complete for IQC.
3. The degrees of ω-mass problems
In this section, we will introduce an extension of the Medvedev lattice, which
we will need to define our first-order hyperdoctrine based on the Medvedev lattice.
As mentioned in the introduction, Kolmogorov mentioned in his paper that solving
the problem ∀xϕ(x) is the same as solving the problem ϕ(x) for all x, uniformly in
x. We formalise this in the spirit of Medvedev and Muchnik in the following way.
Definition 3.1. An ω-mass problem is an element (Ai)i∈ω ∈ (P(ωω))ω . Given two
ω-mass problems (Ai)i∈ω , (Bi)i∈ω , we say that (Ai)i∈ω reduces to (Bi)i∈ω (notation:
(Ai)i∈ω ≤Mω (Bi)i∈ω) if there exists a partial Turing functional Φ such that for every
n ∈ ω we have Φ(n⌢Bn) ⊆ An. If both (Ai)i∈ω ≤Mω (Bi)i∈ω and (Bi)i∈ω ≤Mω
(Ai)i∈ω we say that (Ai)i∈ω and (Bi)i∈ω are equivalent (notation: (Ai)i∈ω ≡Mω
(Bi)i∈ω). We call the equivalence classes of this equivalence the degrees of ω-mass
problems and denote the set of the degrees of ω-mass problems by Mω.
Definition 3.2. Let (Ai)i∈ω, (Bi)i∈ω be ω-mass problems. We say that (Ai)i∈ω
weakly reduces to (Bi)i∈ω (notation: (Ai)i∈ω ≤Mwω (Bi)i∈ω) if for every sequence
(gi)i∈ω with gi ∈ Bi there exists a partial Turing functional Φ such that for every n ∈
ω we have Φ(n⌢gn) ∈ An. If both (Ai)i∈ω ≤Mwω (Bi)i∈ω and (Bi)i∈ω ≤Mwω (Ai)i∈ω
we say that (Ai)i∈ω and (Bi)i∈ω are weakly equivalent (notation: (Ai)i∈ω ≡Mwω
(Bi)i∈ω). We call the equivalence classes of weak equivalence the weak degrees of
ω-mass problems and denote the set of the weak degrees of ω-mass problems by
Mwω.
The next proposition tells us that Mω is a Brouwer algebra, like the Medvedev
lattice.
Proposition 3.3. The degrees of ω-mass problems form a Brouwer algebra.
Proof. We claim that Mω is a Brouwer algebra under the component-wise opera-
tions on M , i.e. the operations induced by:
((Ai)i∈ω ⊕ (Bi)i∈ω)n = {f ⊕ g | f ∈ An, g ∈ Bn}
((Ai)i∈ω ⊗ (Bi)i∈ω)n = 0
⌢An ∪ 1
⌢Bn
((Ai)i∈ω → (Bi)i∈ω)n = {e
⌢f | ∀g ∈ An(Φe(g ⊕ f) ∈ Bn).
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The proof of this is mostly analogous to the proof for the Medvedev lattice, so we will
only give the proof for the implication. Let us first show that (Ai)i∈ω⊕ ((Ai)i∈ω →
(Bi)i∈ω) ≥Mω (Bi)i∈ω . Define a Turing functional Φ by
Φ(n⌢(g ⊕ (e⌢f))) = Φe(g ⊕ f).
Then Φ witnesses that (Ai)i∈ω ⊕ ((Ai)i∈ω → (Bi)i∈ω) ≥Mω (Bi)i∈ω .
Conversely, let (Ci)i∈ω be such that (Ai)i∈ω⊕ (Ci)i∈ω ≥Mω (Bi)i∈ω . Let e ∈ ω be
such that Φe witnesses this fact. Let ϕ be a computable function sending n to an
index for the functional mapping h to Φe(n
⌢h). Let Ψ be the functional sending
n⌢f to ϕ(n)⌢f . Then (Ci)i∈ω ≥Mω (Ai)i∈ω → (Bi)i∈ω through Ψ. 
However, it turns out that this fails for Mwω: it is still a distributive lattice, but
it is not a Brouwer algebra.
Proposition 3.4. The weak degrees of ω-mass problems form a distributive lattice,
but not a Brouwer algebra. In particular, they do not form a complete lattice.
Proof. It is easy to see that Mwω is a distributive lattice under the same operations
as Mω . Towards a contradiction, assume Mwω is a Brouwer algebra, under some
implication →. Let f, g ∈ ωω be two functions of incomparable Turing degree. Let
(Ai)i∈ω be given by Ai = {h | h ≡T f} and let (Bi)i∈ω be given by Bi = {f ⊕ g}.
For every j ∈ ω, let (Cji )i∈ω be given by C
j
i = {g} for i = j, and C
j
i = {f ⊕ g}
otherwise.
Then, for every j ∈ ω we have (Ai)i∈ω⊕(C
j
i )i∈ω ≥Mwω (Bi)i∈ω : given a sequence
(hi)i∈ω with hi ∈ Ai, let e be such that Φe(hj) = f . Now let Φ(n
⌢(s⊕ t)) be t for
n 6= j and Φe(s)⊕ t otherwise. This Φ is the required witness.
So, since we assumed→ makes Mwω into a Brouwer algebra, we know that every
((Ai)i∈ω → (Bi)i∈ω) ≤Mwω (C
j
i )i∈ω for every j ∈ ω. Thus, for every j ∈ ω there is
some gj ≤T g in ((Ai)i∈ω → (Bi)i∈ω)j . For every j ∈ ω, fix a σj ∈ ω<ω such that
there exists an n ∈ ω with Φj(j
⌢(σj ⊕ gj))(n)↓ 6= (f ⊕ g)(n), which exists because
g, and therefore gj ≤T g, does not compute f . Now let fj = σj
⌢f . Then we have
(fi)i∈ω ∈ (Ai)i∈ω and (gi)i∈ω ∈ (Ai)i∈ω → (Bi)i∈ω, but for every j ∈ ω we have
that Φj(j
⌢(fj ⊕ gj)) 6∈ Bj. Thus (Ai)i∈ω ⊕ ((Ai)i∈ω → (Bi)i∈ω) 6≥Mwω (Bi)i∈ω , a
contradiction. 
Finally, let us show that Mω and Mwω are extensions of the Medvedev and
Muchnik lattices, in the sense that the latter embed into the first. Furthermore, we
show that the countable products of M and Mw are quotients of Mω and Mwω.
Proposition 3.5. There is a Brouwer algebra embedding of M into Mω and a
lattice embedding of Mw into Mwω, both given by
α(A)n = A.
Proof. Direct, using the fact that the diagonal of Mω , i.e. {(Ai)i∈ω ∈ Mω | ∀n,m(An =
Am)}, is isomorphic to the diagonal of M ω, which is directly seen to be isomorphic
to M . The same holds for Mwω and Mw. 
Proposition 3.6. There is a Brouwer algebra homomorphism of Mω onto M
ω and
a lattice homomorphism of Mwω onto Mw
ω
.
Proof. Follows directly from the fact that all operations on Mω and Mwω are
component-wise, and the fact that the reducibilities on Mω and Mwω are stronger
than those on M ω respectively M ωw . 
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4. The hyperdoctrine of mass problems
In this section, we will introduce our first-order hyperdoctrine based on M and
Mω, which we will call the hyperdoctrine of mass problems PM . We will take the
categoryC to be the category with objects {1}, {1, 2}, . . . and ω, and with functions
the computable functions between them. We will define PM (ω) to be Mω. Now,
let us look at how to define PM (α) = α
∗ for functions α : ω → ω.
Definition 4.1. Let α : ω → ω. Then α∗ : P(ωω)ω → P(ωω)ω is the function
given by
(α∗((Ai)i∈ω))n = Aα(n).
Proposition 4.2. Let α : ω → ω be a computable function. Then α∗ induces a
well-defined function on Mω by sending (Ai)i∈ω to α∗((Ai)i∈ω), which is in fact a
Brouwer algebra homomorphism.
Proof. We need to show that if (Ai)i∈ω ≤Mω (Bi)i∈ω , then α
∗((Ai)i∈ω) ≤Mω
α∗((Bi)i∈ω). Let Φ witness that A ≤Mω B. Let Ψ be the partial Turing functional
sending n⌢f to Φ(α(n)⌢f). Then Ψ witnesses that α∗((Ai)i∈ω) ≤Mω α
∗((Bi)i∈ω).
That α∗ is a Brouwer algebra homomorphism follows easily from the fact that the
operations on Mω are component-wise. 
Next, we will show that for every computable α we have that α∗ has both right
and left adjoints, which will certainly suffice to satisfy condition (iv) of Definition
2.1.
Proposition 4.3. Let α : ω → ω be a computable function. Then α∗ : Mω → Mω
has a right adjoint ∃α and a left adjoint ∀α.
Proof. Let us first consider the right adjoint. We define:
(∃α((Ai)i∈ω))m = {n
⌢f | f ∈ An ∧ α(n) = m}.
Then ∃α is a well-defined function on Mω. Namely, assume (Ai)i∈ω ≤Mω (Bi)i∈ω,
say through Φ. Let Ψ be the partial functional sending m⌢n⌢h to n⌢Φ(n⌢h), then
Ψ witnesses that ∃α((Ai)i∈ω) ≤Mω ∃α((Bi)i∈ω).
We claim: ∃α is a right adjoint for α∗, i.e. α∗((Ai)i∈ω) ≤Mω (Bi)i∈ω if and only if
(Ai)i∈ω ≤Mω ∃α((Bi)i∈ω). First, let us assume that α
∗((Ai)i∈ω) ≤Mω (Bi)i∈ω ; say
through Φ. Let Ψ be the functional sending j⌢i⌢h to Φ(i⌢h). We claim: for every
m ∈ ω, Ψ(m⌢(∃α((Bi)i∈ω))m) ⊆ Am. Indeed, let n
⌢f ∈ (∃α((Bi)i∈ω))m. Then
α(n) = m and f ∈ Bn. Thus, per choice of Φ we know that
Ψ(m⌢n⌢f) = Φ(n⌢f) ∈ α∗((Ai)i∈ω)n = Aα(n) = Am.
Conversely, assume (Ai)i∈ω ≤Mω ∃α((Bi)i∈ω); say through Ψ. Let Φ be the
functional sending i⌢h to Ψ(α(i)⌢i⌢h). Let n ∈ ω. We claim:
Φ(n⌢Bn) ⊆ (α
∗((Ai)i∈ω))n = Aα(n).
Indeed, let f ∈ Bn. Then n
⌢f ∈ (∃α((Bi)i∈ω))α(n). Thus:
Φ(n⌢f) = Ψ(α(n)⌢n⌢f) ∈ Aα(n).
Next, we consider the left adjoint. We define:
(∀α((Ai)i∈ω))m =
{⊕
n∈ω
fn | ∀n ∈ ω((α(n) = m ∧ fn ∈ An) ∨ (α(n) 6= m ∧ fn = 0))
}
.
Then ∀α is a well-defined function on Mω , as can be proven in a similar way as for
∃α. We claim that it is a left adjoint for α∗, i.e. (Ai)i∈ω ≤Mω α
∗((Bi)i∈ω) if and
only if ∀α((Ai)i∈ω) ≤Mω (Bi)i∈ω.
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First, assume (Ai)i∈ω ≤Mω α
∗((Bi)i∈ω), say through Φ. Let m ∈ ω and let
g ∈ Bm. Now let
f =
⊕
n∈ω
fn
where fn = Φ(n
⌢g) if α(n) = m, and fn = 0 otherwise. Note that, if α(n) = m,
then g ∈ Bm = (α∗((Bi)i∈ω))n, so Φ(n
⌢g) ∈ An. Thus, f ∈ (∀α(ha))m. Note that
this reduction is uniform in g and m, so ∀α((Ai)i∈ω) ≤Mω (Bi)i∈ω.
Conversely, assume ∀α((Ai)i∈ω) ≤Mω (Bi)i∈ω, say through Ψ. Let n ∈ ω and
let g ∈ α∗((Bi)i∈ω)n = Bα(n). Then Ψ(α(n)
⌢g) ∈ (∀α((Ai)i∈ω))α(n). Since clearly
α(n) = α(n), it follows that Ψ(α(n)⌢g)[n] ∈ An. Again this reduction is uniform
in n and g, so (Ai)i∈ω ≤Mω α
∗((Bi)i∈ω). 
Remark 4.4. Note that, if α : ω → ω is is the projection to the first coordinate
(i.e. the function mapping 〈n,m〉 to n), then
∀α((Ai)i∈ω) ≡Mω
({⊕
m∈ω
fm | fm ∈ A〈i,m〉
})
i∈ω
.
We will tacitly identify these two. Similarly,
∃α((Ai)i∈ω) ≡Mω
({
m⌢fm | fm ∈ A〈i,m〉
})
i∈ω
.
We now generalise this notion to include all the functions in our category C. We
will define PM ({1, . . . , n}) to be the n-fold product M
n.
Definition 4.5. Let X,Y ∈ {{1}, {1, 2}, . . .}∪{ω}. Let α : X → Y be computable.
Then α∗ : PM (Y )→ PM (X) is the function given by
α∗((A))i = Aα(i).
Proposition 4.6. The functions from Definition 4.5 are well-defined Brouwer al-
gebra homomorphisms.
Proof. As in Proposition 4.2. 
Proposition 4.7. Let X,Y ∈ {{1}, {1, 2}, . . .} ∪ {ω} and let α : X → Y be
computable. Then α∗ has both left and right adjoints.
Proof. As in Proposition 4.3. 
Thus, everything we have done above leads us to the following definition.
Definition 4.8. Let C be the category with objects {1}, {1, 2}, . . . and ω and
functions the computable functions between them. Let PM be the functor sending
a finite set {1, . . . , n} to M n, ω to Mω and α to α∗. We call this the hyperdoctrine
of mass problems.
We now verify that the remaining conditions of Definition 2.1 hold for PM .
Theorem 4.9. The functor PM from Definition 4.8 is a first-order hyperdoctrine.
Proof. First note that C is closed under all n-fold products, because ωn is iso-
morphic to ω through some fixed computable function 〈a1, . . . , an〉, and similarly
{1, . . . ,m}n is isomorphic to {1, . . . ,mn}.
We now verify the conditions from Definition 2.1. Condition (i) follows from
Proposition 3.3. Condition (ii) follows from Proposition 4.6. For condition (iii),
use the fact that diagonal morphisms are computable together with Proposition
4.7. From the same theorem we know that the projections have left and right
adjoints. Thus, we only need to verify that the Beck-Chevalley condition holds for
them to verify condition (iv). Consider the diagram
10 R. KUYPER
PM (Γ
′ ×X)
(s×1X )
∗
//
(∃x)Γ′

PM (Γ×X)
(∃x)Γ

PM (Γ
′)
s∗
// PM (Γ),
we need to show that it commutes.
We have:
((∃x)Γ((s× 1X)
∗((Ai)i∈Γ′×X)))n = {m
⌢〈n,m〉⌢f | f ∈ A〈s(n),m〉}
and
(s∗((∃x)Γ′ ((Ai)i∈Γ′×X)))n = {〈s(n),m〉
⌢m⌢f | f ∈ A〈s(n),m〉}
by Remark 4.4. Then s∗((∃x)Γ′ ((Ai)i∈Γ×X)) ≤Mω ((∃x)Γ((s× 1X)
∗((Ai)i∈Γ×X)))
through the functional sending i⌢k⌢〈n,m〉⌢f to 〈s(n),m〉⌢m⌢f , and the opposite
inequality holds through the functional sending n⌢〈l,m〉⌢k⌢f to m⌢〈n,m〉⌢f .
Next, consider
PM (Γ
′ ×X)
(s×1X )
∗
//
(∀x)Γ′

PM (Γ×X)
(∀x)Γ

PM (Γ
′)
s∗
// PM (Γ),
we need to show that this also commutes.
Again by Remark 4.4 we have:
((∀x)Γ((s× 1X)
∗((Ai)i∈Γ′×X)))n =
{⊕
m∈ω
fm | fm ∈ A〈s(n),m〉
}
= (s∗((∀x)Γ′ ((Ai)i∈Γ′×X)))n,
as desired. 
For future reference, we state the following lemma which directly follows from
the formula for the right adjoint given in the proof of Proposition 4.3.
Lemma 4.10. For any X, the equality =X in PM is given by:
(=X)〈n,m〉 =
{
ωω if n = m
∅ otherwise.
Proof. From the formula given for the right adjoint in the proof of Proposition 4.3,
and the definition of =X in a first-order hyperdoctrine in Definition 2.1. 
Finally, let us give an easy example of a structure in PM . More examples will
follow in the next sections.
Example 4.11. Consider the language consisting of a constant 0, a unary function
S and binary functions + and ·. We define a structureM in PM . Let the universeM
be ω. Take the interpretation to be the standard model, i.e. J0K = 0, JSK(n) = S(n),
J+K(n,m) = n +m and J·K(n,m) = n · m. Then the sentences which hold in M
are exactly those which have a computable realiser in Kleene’s second realisability
model, see Kleene and Vesley [9, p. 96].
Thus, the hyperdoctrine of mass problems can be seen as an extension of Kleene’s
second realisability model with computable realisers. There is also a topos which
can be seen as an extension of this model, namely the Kleene–Vesley topos, see e.g.
van Oosten [24]. However, this topos does not follow Kolmogorov’s philosophy that
the interpretation of the universal quantifier should be uniform in the variable. On
the other hand, a topos can interpret much more than just first-order logic.
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Note that our category C only contains countable sets. On one hand this could
be seen as a restriction, but on the other hand this should not come as a surprise
since we are dealing with computability. That it is not that much of a restric-
tion is illustrated by the rich literature on computable model theory dealing with
computable, countable models.
5. Theory of the hyperdoctrine of mass problems
Given a first-order language Σ, we wonder what the theory of PM is. In partic-
ular, we want to know: is the theory of PM equal to first-order intuitionistic logic
IQC? To this, the answer is ‘no’ in general: it is well-known that the weak law of
the excluded middle ¬ϕ ∨ ¬¬ϕ holds in the Medvedev lattice; therefore ¬ϕ ∨ ¬¬ϕ
holds in PM for sentences. However, for the Medvedev lattice we have the following
remarkable result by Skvortsova:
Theorem 5.1. (Skvortsova [20]) There is an A ∈ M such that the propositional
theory of M /A, the quotient of M by the principal filter generated by A, is IPC.
Thus, Skortsova’s result tells us that there is a principal factor of the Medvedev
lattice which captures exactly intuitionistic propositional logic. There is a natural
way to extend principal factors to the hyperdoctrine of mass problems: given A
in M , let PM /A be as in Definition 4.8, but with M replaced by M /A, and Mω
replaced by Mω/(A,A, . . . ). It is directly verified that PM /A is also a first-order
hyperdoctrine. Thus, there is a first-order analogue to the problem studied by
Skortsova in the propositional case: is there an A ∈ M such that the sentences
that hold in PM /A are exactly those that are deducible in IQC?
First, note that equality is always decidable (i.e. ∀x, y(x = y∨¬x = y) holds) by
the analogue of Lemma 4.10 (with ωω replaced by A). So, can we get the theory
to equal IQC plus decidable equality? Surprisingly, the answer turns out to be
‘no’ in general, even when we look at intervals instead of just factors. The results
of this section and the next section are summarised in Table 1 below. We study
several types of intervals, and for each approach we state a language and a formula
ϕ which is not true in IQC plus decidable equality, but which is in the theory of
every interval of this type.
Proposition Type (Definition) Language Formula
PM (4.8) Unary R (1)
5.3 [B,A]M (5.2) Nullary R, unary S (2)
5.4 [B,A]M (5.2) Unary R (3)
6.5 [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM (5.5) Arithmetic (4)
Table 1. Formulas not refutable in intervals.
In this table, we use the following formulas:
(1) ∀x(R(x)) ∨ ¬∀x(R(x)),
(2) (∀x, y, z(x = y ∨ x = z ∨ y = z) ∧ ∀z(S(z) ∨R))→ ∀z(S(z)) ∨R,
(3) (∀x(S(x) ∨ ¬S(x)) ∧ ¬∀x(¬S(x))) → ∃x(¬¬S(x)),
(4) T → Con(PA),
where T is some finite set of formulas derivable in Heyting arithmetic.
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Recall that for a poset X and x, y ∈ X with x ≤ y we have that the interval
[x, y]X denotes the set of elements z ∈ X with x ≤ z ≤ y. If B is a Brouwer algebra
then so is [x, y]B, with lattice operations as in B and implication given by
u→[x,y]B v = (u→B v)⊕ x.
If x = 0, this gives us exactly the factor B/y.
We can use this to introduce a specific kind of intervals in the hyperdoctrine of
mass problems.
Definition 5.2. Let A,B ∈ M . Then the interval [B,A]PM is the first-order
hyperdoctrine defined as in Definition 4.8, but with M replaced by [B,A]M , and
Mω replaced by [(B,B, . . . ), (A,A, . . . )]Mω .
It can be directly verified that this is a first-order hyperdoctrine; if one is not
convinced this also follows from the more general Theorem 5.6 below.
The axiom schema CD, consisting of all formulas of the form ∀z(ϕ(z) ∨ ψ) →
∀z(ϕ(z)) ∨ ψ, has been studied because it characterises the Kripke frames with
constant domain. Our first counterexample is based on the fact that a specific
instance of this schema holds in every structure in an interval of M with finite
universe.
Proposition 5.3. Consider the language consisting of one nullary relation R, one
unary relation S and equality. Then for every interval [B,A]PM the formula
(∀x, y, z(x = y ∨ x = z ∨ y = z) ∧ ∀z(S(z) ∨R))→ ∀z(S(z)) ∨R
is in Th
(
[B,A]PM
)
. However, this formula is not in IQC plus decidable equality.
Proof. Let M be a structure in [B,A]PM . Note that by the analogue of Lemma 4.10
we know that if ∀x, y, z(x = y∨x = z∨y = z) does not hold, then it gets interpreted
as A and then the formula certainly holds. However, ∀x, y, z(x = y∨x = z∨ y = z)
can only hold if M has at most two elements. Let us first assume M has two
elements. Let f be an element of J∀z(S(z) ∨ R)K. Then f = f1 ⊕ f2, with f1 ∈
JS(z)∨RK1 and f2 ∈ JS(z)∨RK2.
1 There are two cases: either both f1 and f2 start
with a 0 and we can compute an element of J∀zS(z)K, or one of them starts with a
1 in which case we can compute an element of JRK. Since the reduction is uniform
in f , we see that
J∀z(S(z) ∨R)K ≥M J∀z(S(z)) ∨RK,
and thus the formula given in the statement of the proposition holds. If M has only
one element, a similar proof yields the same result.
To show that the formula is not in IQC, consider the following Kripke frame.
a b
0
Let K0 have universe {1} and let Ka,Kb have universe {1, 2}. Let S(1) be true
everywhere, let S(2) be true only at a and let R be true only at b. Then K is a
Kripke model refuting the formula in the statement of the proposition. 
Note that the schema CD can be refuted in PM , as long as we allow models
over infinite structures: namely, let ϕ(z) = S(z) and ψ(z) = R. We build a
structure M with ω as universe. Let A be a computably independent set, i.e. for
1Note that JS(z) ∨ RK ∈ M 2, so JS(z) ∨ RK1 and JS(z) ∨ RK2 denote the first and second
component.
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every n ∈ ω we have A \ A[n] 6≥T A[n]. Let JSKn = A[n+1] and let JRK = A[0].
Towards a contradiction, assume CD holds in this structure and let Φ witness
J∀z(S(z)∨R)K ≥M J∀z(S(z))∨RK. Now the function f given by f
[n] = 0⌢A[n+1] is
in J∀z(S(z)∨R)K, so Φ(f) ∈ J∀z(S(z))∨RK. Because A is computably independent
f cannot compute A[0], so Φ(f)(0) = 0. Let u be the use of this computation and
let g be the function such that g[n] = f [n] for n ≤ u and g[n] = A[0] for n > u. Then
Φ(g)(0) = 0 so g computes A[u+1], contradicting A being computably independent.
Thus, one might object to our counterexample for being too unnatural by re-
stricting the universe to be finite. However, the next example shows that even
without this restriction we can find a counterexample.
Proposition 5.4. Consider the language consisting of a unary relation R. Then
for every interval [B,A]PM the formula
(∀x(S(x) ∨ ¬S(x)) ∧ ¬∀x(¬S(x))) → ∃x(¬¬S(x)).
is in Th
(
[B,A]PM
)
. However, this formula is not in IQC.
Proof. Towards a contradiction, assume M is some structure satisfying the formula.
Let f ∈ J∀x(S(x) ∨ ¬S(x))K and let g ∈ J¬∀x(¬S(x))K. If for every n ∈M we have
f [n](0) = 1 then f computes an element of J∀x¬S(x)K, which together with g
computes an element of the top element A so then we are done. Otherwise we can
compute from f some n ∈ M with f [n](0) = 0. Let f˜ be f [n] without the first bit.
Let e be an index for the functional sending (k⌢h1) ⊕ h2 to Φk(h2 ⊕ h1). Then if
k⌢h1 ∈ J¬S(x)Kn we have
Φe((k
⌢h1)⊕ f˜) = Φk(f˜ ⊕ h1) ∈ A,
so e⌢f˜ ∈ J¬¬S(x)Kn. Therefore n
⌢e⌢f˜ ∈ J∃x(¬¬S(x))K. So
J∀x(S(x) ∨ ¬S(x))K ⊕ J¬∀x(¬S(x))K ≥Mω J∃x(¬¬S(x))K.
To show that the formula is not in IQC, consider the following Kripke frame.
a
0
Let K0 have universe {1} and let Ka have universe {1, 2}. Let S(1) be false
everywhere and let S(2) be true only at a. Then K is a Kripke model refuting the
formula in the statement of the proposition. 
What the last theorem really says is not that our approach is hopeless, but that
instead of looking at intervals [B,A]PM , we should look at more general intervals.
Right now we are taking the bottom element B to be the same for each i ∈ ω.
Compare this with what happens if in a Kripke model we take the domain at each
point to be the same: then CD holds in the Kripke model. Proposition 5.3 should
therefore not come as a surprise (although it is surprising that the full schema can be
refuted). Instead, we should allow Bi to vary (subject to some constraints); roughly
speaking Bi then expresses the problem of ‘showing that i exists’ or ‘constructing
i’. This motivates the next definition.
Definition 5.5. Let A ∈ M and (Bi)i≥−1 ∈ Mω be such that (A,A, . . . ) ≥Mω
(Bi)i∈ω ≥Mω (B−1,B−1, . . . ) and such that Bi 6≥M A for all i ≥ −1. We define
the interval [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM as follows. Let C be the category with as objects
{{1, . . . ,m}n | n,m ∈ ω} ∪ {ω, ω2, . . . }.
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• Let the morphisms in C be the computable functions α which additionally
satisfy that By ≥M Bα(y) for all y ∈ dom(α) uniformly in y, where we define
B(y1,...,yn) to be By1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Byn .
• We send {1, . . . ,m}n to the Brouwer algebra
[
(Ba1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Ban)(a1,...,an)∈{1,...,m}n , (A,A, . . . )
]
M mn
,
and we send ωn to the Brouwer algebra
[(Ba1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Ban)〈a1,...,an〉∈ω, (A,A, . . . ,A)]Mω .
• We send every morphism α : Y → Z to PM (α) ⊕ (Bi)i∈Y , i.e. the function
sending x to PM (α)(x) ⊕ (Bi)i∈Y , where we implicitly identify ω
n with ω
and {1, . . . ,m}n with {1, . . . ,mn} through some fixed computable bijection.
Theorem 5.6. The interval [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM is a first-order hyperdoctrine.
Proof. First, note that the base category C is closed under n-fold products: indeed,
the n-fold product of Y is just Y n, and the projections are computable functions
satisfying the extra requirement. Furthermore, if α1, . . . , αn : Y → Z are in C,
then (α1, . . . , αn) : Y
n → Z in in C because for all y1, . . . , yn ∈ Y we have
B(y1,...,yn) = By1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Byn ≥M Bα(y1) · · · ⊕ Bα(yn) = B(α1,...,αn)(y1,...,yn),
with reductions uniform in y1, . . . , yn. Finally, for each α : Y → Z in C we
have that PM (α) ⊕ 0Y (where 0Y is the bottom element in the Brouwer algebra
to which Y gets mapped) is a Brouwer algebra homomorphism: that joins and
meets are preserved follows by distributivity, that the top element is preserved
follows directly from (A,A, . . . ) ≥Mω (Bi)i∈ω ≥M (B−1,B−1, . . . ) and that the
bottom element is preserved follows from the assumption that By ≥M Bα(y) for
all y ∈ dom(α) uniformly in y. That implication is preserved is more work: let
α : X → Y . Throughout the remainder of the proof we will implicitly identify ωn
with ω and {1, . . . ,m}n with {1, . . . ,mn} through some fixed bijection 〈a1, . . . , an〉.
Now:
((PM (α)((Ci)i∈Y ))j ⊕ Bj)→[Bj ,A]M ((PM (α)((Di)i∈Y ))j ⊕ Bj)
= ((Cα(j) ⊕ Bj)→ (Dα(j) ⊕ Bj))⊕ Bj
≡M (Cα(j) → Dα(j))⊕ Bj
= (PM (α)((Ci)i∈Y → (Di)i∈Y ))j ⊕ Bj ,
with uniform reductions.
Thus, we need to verify that the product projections have adjoints; in fact, we will
show that every morphism α in the base category C has adjoints. Let α : X → Y .
We claim: PM (α) ⊕ (Bi)i∈X has as a right adjoint ∃α and as a left adjoint the
map sending (Ci)i∈X to ∀α((Bi →M Ci)i∈X) ⊕ (Bi)i∈Y , where ∃α and ∀α are as in
Proposition 4.3. Indeed, we have:
(Di)i∈Y ≤Mω ∃α((Ci)i∈X)⇔ (Dα(i))i∈X ≤Mω (Ci)i∈X
and because (Ci)i∈X ∈ [(Bi)i∈X , (A,A, . . . )]Mω :
⇔ (Bi)i∈X ⊕ (Dα(i))i∈X ≤Mω (Ci)i∈X ⇔ PM (α)((Di)i∈Y )⊕ (Bi)i∈X ≤Mω (Ci)i∈X .
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Similarly, for ∀ we have:
∀α((Bi →M Ci)i∈X)⊕ (Bi)i∈Y ≤Mω (Di)i∈Y
⇔∀α((Bi →M Ci)i∈X) ≤Mω (Di)i∈Y
⇔(Bi →M Ci)i∈X ≤Mω (Dα(i))i∈X
⇔(Ci)i∈X ≤Mω (Bi ⊕Dα(i))i∈X
⇔(Ci)i∈X ≤Mω PM (α)((Di)i∈Y )⊕ (Bi)i∈X .
Finally, we need to verify that [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM satisfies the Beck-Chevalley con-
dition. We have (writing α∗ for the image of the morphism α under the functor for
[(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM ):
((∃x)Γ((s× 1X)
∗((Ci)i∈Γ′×X)))n = {m
⌢〈n,m〉⌢f | f ∈ C(s(n),m) ⊕ Bn ⊕ Bm}
and
(s∗((∃x)Γ′ ((Ci)i∈Γ′×X)))n = {〈s(n),m〉
⌢m⌢f | f ∈ C(s(n),m) ⊕ Bn ⊕ Bs(n)}.
As in the proof of Theorem 4.9 we have
s∗((∃x)Γ′ ((Ci)i∈Γ′×X)) ≤Mω ((∃x)Γ((s× 1X)
∗((Ci)i∈Γ′×X))).
The opposite inequality is also almost the same as in the proof of Theorem 4.9,
except that we now need to use that C(s(n),m) uniformly computes an element of
B(s(n),m) and hence of Bm.
For the other part of the Beck-Chevalley condition we have:
(((∀x)Γ((Bi)i∈Γ′×X → (s× 1X)
∗((Ci)i∈Γ′×X)))⊕ (Bi)i∈Γ)n
=
{⊕
m∈X
fm | fm ∈ Bn ⊕ Bm →
(
Bn ⊕ Bm ⊕ C(s(n),m)
)}
⊕ Bn
≡M
{⊕
m∈X
fm | fm ∈ Bm → C(s(n),m)
}
⊕ Bn.
Now, using the fact that Bs(n) uniformly reduces to Bn:
≡M
{⊕
m∈X
fm | fm ∈ (Bs(n) ⊕ Bm)→ C(s(n),m)
}
⊕ Bs(n) ⊕ Bn
= (s∗((∀x)Γ′ ((Bi)i∈Γ′×X → (Ci)i∈Γ′×X)⊕ (Bi)i∈Γ′ ))n,
as desired. 
In Propositions 7.8 and 7.9 below we will show that we can refute the formulas
from Propositions 5.3 and 5.4 in these more general intervals. Next, let us rephrase
Lemma 4.10 for our intervals.
Lemma 5.7. Given any X in the base category C of [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM , let 0X and
1X be the bottom respectively top elements of the Brouwer algebra corresponding to
X. Then the equality =X in [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM is given by:
(=X)〈n,m〉 =
{
0X if n = m
1X otherwise.
Proof. From the formula given for the right adjoint in the proof of Theorem 5.6,
and the definition of =X in a first-order hyperdoctrine in Definition 2.1. 
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As a final remark, note that we cannot vary A (i.e. make intervals of the form
[(Bi)i≥−1, (Ai)i≥−1]PM ): if we did, then to make α
∗ into a homomorphism we would
need to meet with Ai. While joining with Bi was not a problem, if we meet with
Ai the implication will in general not be preserved.
6. Heyting arithmetic in intervals of the hyperdoctrine of mass
problems
In the previous section we introduced the general intervals [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM . How-
ever, it turns out that even these intervals cannot capture every theory in IQC, in
the sense that there are deductively closed theories T for which there is no structure
in any general interval which has as theory exactly T . We will show this by looking
at models of Heyting arithmetic. Our approach is based on the following classical
result about computable classical models of Peano arithmetic.
Theorem 6.1. (Tennenbaum [22]) There is no computable non-standard model of
Peano arithmetic.
Proof. (Sketch) Let A,B be two c.e. sets which are computably inseparable and for
which PA proves that they are disjoint (e.g. take A = {e ∈ ω | {e}(e)↓ = 0} and
B = {e ∈ ω | {e}(e)↓ = 1}). Let ϕ(e) = ∃sϕ′(e, s) define A and let ψ(e) = ∃sψ′(e, s)
define B, where ϕ, ψ are ∆00-formulas which are monotone in s. Now consider the
following formulas:
α1 = ∀e, s∀s
′ ≥ s((ϕ′(e, s)→ ϕ′(e, s′)) ∧ (ψ′(e, s)→ ψ′(e, s′)))
α2 = ∀e, s(¬(ϕ
′(e, s) ∧ ψ′(e, s)))
α3 = ∀n, p∃!a, b(b < p ∧ ap+ b = n)
α4 = ∀n∃m∀e < n(ϕ
′(e, n)↔ ∃a < n(ape = m)),
where pe denotes the eth prime.
These are all provable in PA. The first formula tells us that ϕ′ and ψ′ are mono-
tone in s. The second formula expresses that A and B are disjoint. The third
formula says that the Euclidean algorithm holds. The last formula tells us that for
every n, we can code the elements of A[n]∩ [0, n) as a single number. We can prove
this inductively, by letting m be the product of those pe such that e ∈ A[n]∩ [0, n).
Thus, every non-standard model of Peano arithmetic also satisfies these formulas.
Towards a contradiction, let M be a computable non-standard model of PA. Let
n ∈M be a non-standard element, i.e. n > k for every standard k. Let m ∈M be
such that
M |= ∀e < n(ϕ′(e, n)↔ ∃a < n.ape = m).
If e ∈ A, then ϕ′(e, s) holds in the standard model for large enough standard s, and
since M is a model of Robinson’s Q and ϕ′ is ∆00 we see that also M |= ϕ
′(e, s) for
large enough standard s. By monotonicity, we therefore have M |= ϕ′(e, n). Thus,
M |= ∃a < n.ape = m.
Conversely, if e ∈ B, then M |= ψ′(e, s) for large enough standard s, so by
monotonicity we see that M |= ψ′(e, n). Therefore, M |= ¬ϕ′(e, n) by α2. Thus,
M |= ¬(∃a < n.ape = m). So, the set C = {e ∈ ω | M |= ∃a, b < n.apSe(0) = m}
separates A and B.
However, C is also computable: because the Euclidean algorithm holds in M, we
know that there exist unique a, b with b < pSe(0) such that apSe(0) + b = m. Since
M is computable we can find those a and b computably. Now e is in C if and only
if b = 0. This contradicts A and B being computably separable. 
When looking at models of arithmetic, we often use that fairly basic systems
(like Robinson’s Q) already represent the computable functions (a fact which we
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used in the proof of Tennenbaum’s theorem above). In other words, this tells us
that there is not much leeway to change the truth of ∆01-statements. The next
two lemmas show that in a language without any relations except equality (like
arithmetic), as long as our formulas are ∆01, their truth value in the hyperdoctrine
of mass problems is essentially classical; in other words, there is also no leeway to
make their truth non-classical.
Lemma 6.2. Let Σ be a language without relations (except possibly equality). Let
[(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM be an interval and let M be a structure for Σ in [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM .
Let ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) be a ∆
0
0-formula and let a1, . . . , an ∈ M . Then we have either
Jϕ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M B−1⊕Ba1⊕· · ·⊕Ban or Jϕ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M A,
with the first holding if and only if ϕ(a1, . . . , an) holds classically in the classical
model induced by M (i.e. the classical model with universe M and functions as in
M).
Furthermore, it is decidable which of the two cases holds, and the reductions
between Jϕ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 and either Ba1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Ban or A are uniform in
a1, . . . , an.
Proof. We prove this by induction on the structure of ϕ.
• ϕ is of the form t(x1, . . . , xn) = s(x1, . . . , xn): by Lemma 5.7 we know that
Jt(x1, . . . , xn) = s(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 is either B−1 ⊕ Ba1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Ban or
A, with the first holding if and only if t(a1, . . . , an) = s(a1, . . . , an) holds
classically. Since all functions are computable and equality is true equality,
it is decidable which of the two cases holds.
• ϕ is of the form ψ(x1, . . . , xn) ∧ χ(x1, . . . , xn): there are three cases:
– If both Jψ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 and Jχ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 are equi-
valent to B−1 ⊕ Ba1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Ban , then Jϕ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M
B−1 ⊕ Ba1 ⊕ · · · ⊕Ban ,
– If Jψ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M A, then Jϕ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M A
by sending f ⊕ g to f ,
– If Jχ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M A, then Jϕ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M A
by sending f ⊕ g to g.
This case distinction is decidable because the induction hypothesis tells us
that the truth of ψ and χ is decidable.
• ϕ is of the form ψ(x1, . . . , xn) → χ(x1, . . . , xn): this follows directly from
the fact that, in any Brouwer algebra with top element 1 and bottom ele-
ment 0, we have 0 → 1 = 1 and 0 → 0 = 1 → 1 = 1 → 0 = 0. The case
distinction is again decidable by the induction hypothesis.
The other cases are similar. 
Lemma 6.3. Let Σ,A, (Bi)i≥−1 and M be as in Lemma 6.2. Let T be some theory
which is satisfied by M, i.e. JψKM = B−1 for every ψ ∈ T . Let ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) be a
formula which is ∆01 over T and let a1, . . . , an ∈M . Then either Jϕ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M
B−1 ⊕Ba1 ⊕ . . .Ban or Jϕ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M A, with the first holding if and
only if ϕ(a1, . . . , an) holds classically in M.
Furthermore, it is decidable which of the two cases holds, and the reductions are
uniform in a1, . . . , an.
Proof. Let
ϕ⇔ ∀y1, . . . , ymψ(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym)⇔ ∃y1, . . . , ymχ(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym),
where ψ and χ are ∆00-formulas. Then by soundness (see Proposition 2.10) we know
that
(5)
J∀y1, . . . , ymψ(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym)K ≡Mω J∃y1, . . . , ymχ(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym)K.
18 R. KUYPER
Let a1, . . . , an ∈M . We claim: there are some b1, . . . , bm such that either
(6) Jψ(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym)K〈a1,...,an,b1,...,bm〉 ≡M A
or
(7) Jχ(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym)K〈a1,...,an,b1,...,bm〉 ≡M Ba1⊕· · ·⊕Ban⊕Bb1⊕· · ·⊕Bbm .
Indeed, otherwise we see from Lemma 6.2 and some easy calculations that
J∀y1, . . . , ymψ(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M B−1 ⊕ Ba1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Ban
and
J∃y1, . . . , ymχ(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M A,
which contradicts (5).
Thus, again by Lemma 6.2, we can find b1, . . . , bm computably such that either
(6) or (7) holds. First, if (6) holds, then it can be directly verified that
J∀y1, . . . , ymψ(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M A,
while if (7) holds, then it can be directly verified that
J∃y1, . . . , ymχ(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M B−1 ⊕ Ba1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Ban ,
with all the reductions uniform in a1, . . . , an. 
Next, we slightly extend this to Π01-formulas and Σ
0
1-formulas, although at the
cost of dropping the uniformity.
Lemma 6.4. Let Σ,A, (Bi)i≥−1 and M be as in Lemma 6.2. Let ϕ(x1, . . . , xn)
be a Π01-formula or a Σ
0
1-formula and let a1, . . . , an ∈ M . Then we have either
Jϕ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M B−1 ⊕Ba1 ⊕ . . .Ban or Jϕ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M A,
with the first holding if and only if ϕ(a1, . . . , an) holds classically in M.
2
Proof. Let ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) = ∀y1, . . . , ymψ(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn) with ψ a ∆00-formula.
First, let us assume ϕ(a1, . . . , an) holds classically. Thus, for all b1, . . . , bm ∈M we
know that ψ(a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bm) holds classically. By Lemma 6.2 we then know
that ψ(a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bm) gets interpreted as Ba1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Ban ⊕Bb1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Bbm
(by a reduction uniform in b1, . . . , bm). Now note that
JϕK〈a1,...,an〉
≡M
⊕
〈b1,...,bm〉∈ω
(
(Ba1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Ban ⊕ Bb1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Bbm)
→M Jψ(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym)K〈a1,...,an,b1,...,bm〉
)
⊕ (B−1 ⊕ Ba1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Ban)
≡M B−1 ⊕ Ba1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Ban .
Now, let us assume ϕ(a1, . . . , an) does not hold classically. Let b1, . . . , bm ∈ M
be such that ψ(a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bm) does not hold classically. By Lemma 6.2 we
know that ψ(a1, . . . , an, b1 . . . , bm) gets interpreted as A. Then it is directly checked
that in fact
Jϕ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≥M A,
as desired.
The proof for Σ01-formulas ϕ is similar. 
Now, we will prove an analogue of Theorem 6.1 for the hyperdoctrine of mass
problems.
2However, unlike the previous two lemmas, the reductions need not be uniform in a1, . . . , an.
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Theorem 6.5. Let Σ be the language of arithmetic consisting of a function symbol
for every primitive recursive function, and equality. There is a finite set of formulas
T ⊃ Q derivable in Heyting arithmetic such that for every interval [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM
and every classically true Π01-sentence or Σ
0
1-sentence χ we have that every structure
M in [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM satisfies
∧
T → χ. In particular this holds for χ = Con(PA)
and so for this language of arithmetic we have Th
(
[(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM
)
6= IQC.
Proof. Our proof is inspired by the proof of Theorem 6.1 given above. Let A, B,
ϕ′ and ψ′ as in that proof. We first define a theory T ′ which consists of Q together
with the formulas
∀e, s∀s′ ≥ s((ϕ′(e, s)→ ϕ′(e, s′)) ∧ (ψ′(e, s)→ ψ′(e, s′)))
∀n, s(¬ϕ′(n, s) ∧ ψ′(n, s))
∀n, p∃!a, b(b < p ∧ ap+ b = n)
∀n∃m∀k, s < n(ϕ′(k, s)↔ ∃a, b < n.apk = m).
Then T ′ is deducible in Peano arithmetic; in particular it holds in the standard
model. Note that T ′ is equivalent to a Π02-formula. Furthermore, note that there
are computable Skolem functions (for example, take the function mapping n to the
least witness). Thus, we can get rid of the existential quantifiers; for example, we
can replace
∀n, p∃a, b(b < p ∧ ap+ b = n)
by
∀n, p(g(n, p) < p ∧ f(n, p)p+ g(n, p) = n)
where f is the symbol representing the primitive recursive function sending (n, p)
to n divided by p, and g is the symbol representing the primitive recursive function
sending (n, p) to the remainder of the division of n by p. We can also turn Q into
a Π01-theory using the predecessor function.
So, let T consist of a Π01-formula which is equivalent to T
′, together with Π01
defining axioms for the finitely many computable functions we used. Then T is
certainly deducible in PA, but it is also deducible in Heyting arithmetic because
every Π02-sentence which is in PA in also in HA, see e.g. Troelstra and van Dalen
[23, Proposition 3.5].
Now, if J
∧
T K ≡M A, we are done. We may therefore assume this is not the case.
Then, by Lemma 6.4 we see that T holds classically in M. Therefore T ′ also holds
classically in M, and by the proof of Theorem 6.1 we see that M is classically the
standard model. Therefore χ holds classically in M so we see by Lemma 6.4 that
JχK ≡M B−1. 
7. Decidable frames
In the last section we saw that there are languages such that even for every
interval [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM we have that Th
(
[(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM
)
6= IQC. However, note
that Heyting arithmetic, like Peano arithmetic is undecidable. We therefore wonder:
what happens if we look at decidable theories? In the classical case, we know that
every decidable theory has a decidable model. The intuitionistic case was studied
by Gabbay [4] and Ishihara, Khoussainov and Nerode [7, 8], culminating in the
following result.
Definition 7.1. A Kripke model is decidable if the underlying Kripke frame is
computable, the universe at every node is computable and the forcing relation
w  ϕ(a1, . . . , an)
is computable.
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Definition 7.2. A theory is decidable if its deductive closure is computable and
equality is decidable, i.e.
∀x, y(x = y ∨ ¬x = y)
holds.
Theorem 7.3. ([7, Theorem 5.1]) Every decidable theory T has a decidable Kripke
model, i.e. a decidable Kripke model whose theory is exactly the set of sentences
deducible from T .3
Our next result shows how to encode such decidable Kripke models in intervals
of the hyperdoctrine of mass problems. Unfortunately we do not know how to deal
with arbitrary decidable Kripke frames; instead we have to restrict to those without
infinite ascending chains. As we will see later in this section, this nonetheless still
proves to be useful.
Theorem 7.4. Let K be a decidable Kripke model which is based on a Kripke frame
without infinite ascending chains. Then there is an interval [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM and a
structure M in [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM such that the theory of M is exactly the theory of
K.
Furthermore, if we allow infinite ascending chains, then this still holds for the
fragments of the theories without universal quantifiers.
Proof. Let T = {t0, t1, . . . } be a computable representation of the poset T on which
K is based. Let f0, f1, . . . be an antichain in the Turing degrees and let D = {g |
∃i(g ≤T fi)}. Consider the collection V = {C({fi | i ∈ I}∪D) | I ⊆ ω}. By Kuyper
[12, Theorem 3.3], this is a sub-implicative semilattice of [C({fi | i ∈ ω})∪D,D]M .
We will use the mass problems C({fi | i 6= j})∪D to represent the points tj of the
Kripke frame T . If T were finite, we would only have to consider a finite sub-upper
semilattice of V , and by Skvortsova [20, Lemma 2] the meet-closure of this would be
exactly the Brouwer algebra of upwards closed subsets of T . However, since in our
case T might be infinite, we need to suitably generalise this to arbitrary ‘meets’.
Let us now describe how to do this. First, we define A:
A = {k1
⌢k2
⌢
(
C({fi | i 6∈ {k1, k2}}) ∪D
)
| tk1 and tk2 are incomparable)}
if T is not a chain, and A = D otherwise. The idea behind A is that if tk1 and tk2
are incomparable in T , then there should be no mass problem representing a point
above their representations.
Now, let U be the collection of upwards closed subsets of T . We then define the
map α : U → M by:
α(Y ) =
⋃
{j⌢
((
C({fi | i 6= j}) ∪ D
)
⊗A
)
| tj ∈ Y },
and α(∅) = A. Now let B−1 = α(T ) and let Bi = α(Zi), where Zi is the set of
nodes where i is in the domain of K. Then α : U → [B−1,A] as a function; we are
not yet claiming that it preserves the Brouwer algebra structure. We will prove a
stronger result for a suitable sub-collection of U below.
First, let us show that α is injective. Indeed, assume α(Y ) ≤M α(Z). We will
show that Y ⊇ Z. By applying Lemma 7.5 below twice we then have that for
every j with tj ∈ Z there exists a k with tk ∈ Y such that either C({fi | i 6=
k}) ∪ D ≤M C({fi | i 6= j}) ∪ D or A ≤M C({fi | i 6= j}) ∪ D. In the first case,
towards a contradiction let us assume that k 6= j. Then fk computes an element
3In [7] this result is stated for first-order languages without equality and function symbols.
However, we can apply the original result to the language with an additional binary predicate
R representing equality and to the theory T ′ consisting of T extended with the equality axioms.
Using this equality we can now also represent functions by relations in the usual way.
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of C({fi | i 6= j}) ∪ D and therefore fk ∈ C({fi | i 6= k}) ∪ D since the latter is
upwards closed. However, this contradicts the fact that the fi form an antichain in
the Turing degrees. Thus, k = j and therefore tj ∈ Y .
In the latter case, we have that C({fi | i 6∈ {k1, k2}) ∪ D ≤M C({fi | i 6=
j}) ∪ D for some k1, k2 ∈ ω for which tk1 and tk2 are incomparable. Without loss
of generality, let us assume that k1 6= j. Then, reasoning as above, we see that
fk1 ∈ C({fi | i 6∈ {k1, k2}) ∪ D, a contradiction.
For ease of notation, let us assume the union of the universes of K is ω; the
general case follows in the same way. Let M be the structure with functions as in
K, and let the interpretation of a relation JR(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 be α(Y ), where
Y is exactly the set of nodes where R(a1, . . . , an) holds in K.
We show that M is as desired. To this end, we claim: for every formula
ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) and every sequence a1, . . . , an,
Jϕ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M α(Y ),
where Y is exactly the set of nodes where a1, . . . , an are all in the domain and
ϕ(a1, . . . , an) holds in the Kripke model K. Furthermore, we claim that this reduc-
tion is uniform in a1, . . . , an and in ϕ. We prove this by induction on the structure
of ϕ. First, if ϕ is atomic, this follows directly from the choice of the valuations,
from the fact that K is decidable and from Lemma 5.7.
Next, let us consider ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) = ψ(x1, . . . , xn) ∨ χ(x1, . . . , xn). Let U be
the set of nodes where ψ(a1, . . . , an) holds in K and similarly let V be the set of
nodes where χ(a1, . . . , an) holds. By induction hypothesis and by the definition of
the interpretation of ∨ we have
Jψ(x1, . . . , xn) ∨ χ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉
≡M α(U) ⊗ α(V )
=
⋃
{j⌢
((
C({fi | i 6= j}) ∪ D
)
⊗A
)
| tj ∈ U}
⊗
⋃
{j⌢
((
C({fi | i 6= j}) ∪ D
)
⊗A
)
| tj ∈ V }.
We need to show that this is equivalent to
α(Y ) =
⋃
{j⌢
((
C({fi | i 6= j}) ∪ D
)
⊗A
)
| tj ∈ Y },
where Y is the set of nodes where ϕ(a1, . . . , an) holds. First, let j
⌢f ∈ α(Y ). Then
ϕ(a1, . . . , an) holds at tj . Thus, by the definition of truth in Kripke frames, we know
that at least one of ψ(a1, . . . , an) and χ(a1, . . . , an) holds in tj , and because our
frame is decidable we can compute which of them holds. So, send j⌢f to 0⌢j⌢f
if ψ(a1, . . . , an) holds, and to 1
⌢j⌢f otherwise. Thus, α(U) ⊗ α(V ) ≤M α(Y ).
Conversely, if either ψ(a1, . . . , an) or χ(a1, . . . , an) holds then ϕ(a1, . . . , an) holds,
so the functional sending i⌢j⌢f to j⌢f witnesses that α(Y ) ≤M α(U) ⊗ α(V ).
The proof for conjunction is similar. Next, let us consider implication. So, let
ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) = ψ(x1, . . . , xn) → χ(x1, . . . , xn). Let U be the set of nodes where
ψ(a1, . . . , an) holds in K, let V be the set of nodes where χ(a1, . . . , an) holds and
let Y be the set of nodes where ϕ(a1, . . . , an) holds. By induction hypothesis, we
know that
Jϕ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉
≡M α(U)→[B(a1,...,an),A] α(V ).
First, note that α(Y ) ≥M α(U) →[B(a1,...,an),A] α(V ) is equivalent to α(Y ) ⊕
α(U) ≥M α(V ). So, let k
⌢h ∈ α(Y ) and j⌢g ∈ α(U). Then tk ∈ Y , h ∈(
C({fi | i 6= k}) ∪ D
)
⊗ A, tj ∈ U and g ∈
(
C({fi | i 6= j}) ∪ D
)
⊗ A. We need
to uniformly compute from this some m ∈ ω with tm ∈ Y and an element of
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(
C({fi | i 6∈ pm}) ∪D
)
⊗A. First, if either the first bit of h or g is 1, then h or g,
respectively, computes an element of A. So, we may assume this is not the case.
Then there are i1 6= j and i2 6= k such that g ≥T fi1 and h ≥T fi2 . If i1 6= i2 then
h⊕ g ∈ D, and if i1 = i2 then h⊕ g ∈ C({fi | i 6∈ {k, j}}). So, we have
h⊕ g ∈ C({fi | i 6∈ {k, j}}) ∪ D.
There are now two cases: if tk and tj are incomparable then k
⌢j⌢(h ⊕ g) ∈ A.
Otherwise, compute m ∈ {k, j} such that tm = max(tk, tj). Then, because tk ∈ Y
and tj ∈ U , we know that tm ∈ V and that h⊕ g ∈ C({fi | i 6= m}) ∪ D, which is
exactly what we needed. Since this is all uniform we therefore see
α(Y ) ≥M Jϕ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉.
Conversely, take any element
(e⌢g)⊕ h ∈ (α(U)→M α(V ))⊕ B(a1,...,an) = α(U)→[B(a1,...,an),A] α(V ).
We need to compute an element of α(Y ). Let Z be the collection of nodes where
a1, . . . , an are all in the domain. Then h computes some element h˜ ∈ α(Z), as
follows from the definition of B(a1,...,an) and the fact that we have already proven
the claim for conjunctions applied to Jx1 = x1 ∧ · · · ∧ xn = xnK〈a1,...,an〉. If the
second bit of h˜ is 1, then h˜ computes an element of A and therefore also computes
an element of α(Y ). So, we may assume it is 0. Let k = h˜(0). First compute if
ϕ(a1, . . . , an) holds in K at the node tk; if so, we know that h˜ ∈ α(Y ) so we are
done. Otherwise, there must be a node tk˜ (above tk) such that tk˜ ∈ U but tk˜ 6∈ V .
Let σ be the least string such that Φ(e)
(
g ⊕
(
k˜⌢0⌢σ
))
(0)↓ and such that
Φ(e)
(
g ⊕
(
k˜⌢0⌢σ
))
(1)↓ and letm = Φe
(
g ⊕
(
k˜⌢0⌢σ
))
(0) (such a σ much exist,
since there is some initial segment of k˜⌢0⌢fk˜+1 ∈ α(U) for which this must halt
by choice of g and e). Then we see, by choice of g and e that tm ∈ V and that
{g} ⊕ C
({
fi | i 6= k˜
})
≥M {g} ⊕
(
σ⌢C
({
fi | i 6= k˜
}))
≥M
(
C({fi | i 6= m}) ∪ D
)
⊗A.
In fact, since the value at 1 has also already been decided by choice of σ, we even
get that either
{g} ⊕ C
({
fi | i 6= k˜
})
≥M A
or
{g} ⊕ C
({
fi | i 6= k˜
})
≥M C({fi | i 6= m}) ∪ D.
In the first case, we are clearly done. Otherwise, we claim: g⊕h˜ ∈ C({fi | i 6= m)∪D.
We distinguish several cases:
• If h˜ ∈ D, then g ⊕ h˜ ≥T h˜ ∈ D and D is upwards closed.
• Otherwise, h˜ ≥T fi for some i 6= k. If i 6= k˜, then we have just seen that
g ⊕ h˜ computes an element of C({fi | i 6= m}) ∪ D. Since the latter is
upwards closed, we see that g ⊕ h˜ ∈ C({fi | i 6= m}) ∪ D.
• If h˜ ≥T fk˜, then g ⊕ h˜ ≥T h˜ ∈ C({fi | i 6= m): after all, tm ∈ V while
tk˜ 6∈ V , so k˜ 6= m.
Thus, g ⊕ h˜ uniformly computes an element of α(Y ), which is what we needed to
show.
Now, let us consider the quantifiers. So, let ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) = ∀yψ(x1, . . . , xn, y).
For every b ∈ ω, let Ub be the set of nodes where ψ(a1, . . . , an, b) holds in K, and
likewise let Y be the set of nodes where ϕ(a1, . . . , an) holds. We need to show that
Jϕ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M α(Y ).
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By definition of the interpretation of the universal quantifier and the induction
hypothesis, we know that
Jϕ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M
(⊕
b∈ω
B(a1,...,an,b) →M α(Ub)
)
⊕ Ba1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Ban
=
⊕
b∈ω
B(a1,...,an,b) →[B(a1,...,an),A]M α(Ub).
Let Zb be the set of nodes where a1, . . . , an and b are in the domain, and let Z be
the set of nodes where a1, . . . , an are in the domain. Then we get in the same way
as above:
Jϕ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M
⊕
b∈ω
α(Zb)→[B(a1,...,an),A]M α(Ub).
Finally, let us introduce new predicates Rb(x1, . . . , xn), which are defined to hold
in K if ϕ(x1, . . . , xn, b) holds in K, and let us introduce new nullary predicates Sb
which are defined to hold when all of a1, . . . , an and b are in the domain. Then,
applying the fact that we have already proven the claim for implications to JSb →
RbK〈a1,...,an〉, we get
Jϕ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M
⊕
b∈ω
α((Zb → Ub) ∩ Z).
We now claim that this is equivalent to α(Y ). We have Y ⊆ (Zb → Ub) ∩ Z by the
definition of truth in Kripke frames, which suffices to prove that⊕
b∈ω
α((Zb → Ub) ∩ Z) ≤M α(Y ).
Conversely, let ⊕
b∈ω
gb ∈
⊕
b∈ω
α((Zb → Ub) ∩ Z).
We show how to compute an element of α(Y ) from this. If the second bit of g0
is 1, then h computes an element of A; thus, assume it is 0. Let m0 = g0(0).
First compute if ϕ(a1, . . . , an) holds in K at the node γ(tm0); if so, we know that
g0 ∈ α(Y ) so we are done. Therefore, we may assume this is not the case. So, we
can compute a b1 ∈ ω such that tm0 6∈ Zb1 → Ub1 by the definition of truth in
Kripke frames. Now consider gb1 . If the second bit of gb1 is 1, then gb1 computes an
element of A so we are done. Otherwise, let m1 = gb1(0). Then tm1 ∈ Zb1 → Ub1
and gb1 ∈ C(fi | i 6= m1) ∪ D. Then m1 6≤ m0 because tm0 6∈ Zb1 → Ub1 . If m1 is
incomparable with m0, then m0
⌢m1
⌢(gb1 ⊕h) ∈ A so we are done. Thus, the only
remaining case is when m1 > m0.
Iterating this argument, if it does not terminate after finitely many steps, we ob-
tain a sequencem0 < m1 < m2 < . . . . However, we assumed that our Kripke frame
does not contain any infinite ascending chains, so the algorithm has to terminate
after finitely many steps. Thus,⊕
b∈ω
α((Zb → Ub) ∩ Z) ≥M α(Y ).
We note that this is the only place in the proof where we use the assumption about
infinite ascending chains.
Finally, we consider the existential quantifier. To this end, let ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) =
∃yψ(x1, . . . , xn, y). Let Ub and Z be as for the universal quantifier. Then the
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induction hypothesis tells us that
Jϕ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M
⋃
{b⌢α(Yb) | b ∈ ω}.
First, since Yb ⊆ Z, we certainly have that α(Z) ≤M
⋃
{b⌢α(Yb) | b ∈ ω}. Con-
versely, let j⌢f ∈ α(Z). Then f ∈
(
C(fi | i 6= j) ∪D
)
⊗ A and tj ∈ Z. Thus,
there is some b ∈ ω such that ψ(a1, . . . , an, b) holds, and therefore by induction
hypothesis j⌢f ∈ α(Yb). Furthermore, since K is decidable we can compute such a
b. Thus, α(Z) ≥M
⋃
{b⌢α(Yb) | b ∈ ω}, which completes the proof of the claim.
Thus, by the claim we have that, for any sentence ϕ, that JϕK = α(Y ), where Y
is the set of nodes where ϕ holds in the Kripke model K. Furthermore, α is injective
so α(Y ) = B−1 if and only if Y = T . So, ϕ holds in M if and only if Y = T if and
only if ϕ holds in K, which is what we needed to show.
For the second part of the theorem, note that we only used the assumption
about infinite ascending chains in the part of the proof dealing with the universal
quantifier. 
Lemma 7.5. Let C ⊆ ωω be non-empty and upwards closed under Turing redu-
cibility, let Ei ⊆ ω
ω and let
⋃
{i⌢Ei} ≤M C. Then there is an i ∈ ω such that
Ei ≤M C.
Proof. Let Φe(C) ⊆
⋃
{i⌢Ei}. Let σ be the least string such that Φe(σ)(0)↓. Such
a string must exist, because C is non-empty. Let i = Φe(σ)(0). Then:
C ≥M σ
⌢C ≥M Ei,
as desired. 
Our proof relativises if our language does not contain function symbols, which
gives us the following result.
Theorem 7.6. Let K be a Kripke model for a language without function symbols
which is based on a Kripke frame without infinite ascending chains. Then there
is an interval [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM and a structure M in [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM such that the
theory of M is exactly the theory of K.
Furthermore, if we allow infinite ascending chains, then this still holds for the
fragments of the theories without universal quantifiers.
Proof. Let h be such that K is h-decidable. We relativise the construction in the
proof of Theorem 7.4 to h. We let all definitions be as in that proof, except where
mentioned otherwise. This time we let fi be an antichain over h, i.e. for all i 6= j
we have fi ⊕ h 6≥T fj . We change the definition of D into {g | ∃i(g ≤T fi ⊕ h)} We
let
A = {
(
k1
⌢k2
⌢
(
C({fi | i 6∈ {k1, k2}}) ∪ D
))
⊕ h | tk1 and tk2 are incomparable}
if T is not a chain, and let A = D ⊕ h otherwise. We let β(Y ) = α(Y ) ⊕ {h}
for all Y ∈ U . Then β is still injective. Indeed, let us assume β(Y ) ≤M β(Z);
we will show that Y ⊇ Z. By applying Lemma 7.7 below we see that for every j
with tj ∈ Z there exists a k with tk ∈ Y such that either
(
C({fi | i 6= k}) ∪D
)
⊕
{h} ≤M
(
C({fi | i 6= j}) ∪ D
)
⊕ {h} or A ≤M
(
C({fi | i 6= j}) ∪D
)
⊕ {h}. If the
first holds, let us assume that k 6= j; we will derive a contradiction from this. Then
fk ∈ C({fi | i 6= j}) ∪ D and therefore fk ⊕ h ∈ C({fi | i 6= k}) ∪ D since this set
is upwards closed. However, we know that the fi form an antichain over h in the
Turing degrees, which is a contradiction. So, k = j and therefore tj ∈ Y .
In the second case, we have that
C({fi | i 6∈ {k1, k2}) ∪ D ≤M
(
C({fi | i 6= j}) ∪ D
)
⊕ {h}
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for some k1, k2 ∈ ω for which tk1 and tk2 are incomparable. Without loss of gen-
erality, we may assume that k1 6= j. Then, in the same way as above, we see that
fk1 ⊕ h ∈ C({fi | i 6∈ {k1, k2}) ∪ D which is again a contradiction.
We let B−1 = β(T ) and we let Bi = β(Zi), where Zi is the set of nodes where i is
in the domain of K. We claim: for every formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) and every sequence
a1, . . . , an,
Jϕ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M β(Y ),
where Y is exactly the set of nodes where a1, . . . , an are all in the domain and
ϕ(a1, . . . , an) holds in the Kripke model K. The proof is the same as before, except
that this time we use that all mass problems we deal with are above B−1 = α(T )⊕
{h} and hence uniformly compute h. Thus, we can still decide all the properties
about K which we need during the proof. 
Lemma 7.7. Let C ⊆ ωω be non-empty and upwards closed under Turing reducib-
ility, let Ei ⊆ ωω, let h ∈ ωω and let
⋃
{i⌢Ei} ≤M C ⊕ {h}. Then there is an i ∈ ω
such that Ei ≤M C.
Proof. Let Φe(C) ⊆
⋃
{i⌢Ei}. Let σ be the least string such that Φe(σ ⊕ h)(0)↓.
Such a string must exist, because C is non-empty. Let i = Φe(σ ⊕ h)(0). Then:
C ⊕ h ≥M (σ
⌢C)⊕ h ≥M Ei,
as desired. 
We will now use Theorem 7.6 to show that we can refute the formulas discussed
in section 5.
Proposition 7.8. There is an interval [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM and a structure M in
[(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM such that M refutes the formula
∀x, y, z(x = y ∨ x = z ∨ y = z) ∧ ∀z(S(z) ∨R)→ ∀z(S(z)) ∨R
from Proposition 5.3.
Proof. As shown in the proof of Proposition 5.3 there is a finite Kripke frame
refuting the formula. Now apply Theorem 7.6. 
Proposition 7.9. There is an interval [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM and a structure M in
[(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM such that M refutes the formula
(∀x(S(x) ∨ ¬S(x)) ∧ ¬∀x(¬S(x))) → ∃x(¬¬S(x)).
from Proposition 5.4.
Proof. In the proof of Proposition 5.4 we showed that there is a finite Kripke frame
refuting the given formula. So, the claim follows from Theorem 7.6. 
Thus, moving to the more general intervals [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM did allow us to refute
more formulas. Let us next note that Theorem 6.5 really depends on the fact that
we chose the language of arithmetic to contain function symbols.
Proposition 7.10. Let Σ be the language of arithmetic, but formulated with re-
lations instead of with function symbols. Let T be derivable in PA and let χ be a
Π01-sentence or Σ
0
1-sentence which is not derivable in PA. Then there is an interval
[(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM and a structure M in [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM refuting
∧
T → χ.
Proof. Let K be a classical model refuting
∧
T → χ, which can be seen as a Kripke
model on a frame consisting of one point. Now apply Theorem 7.6. 
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Finally, let us consider the schema ∀x¬¬ϕ(x) → ¬¬∀xϕ(x), called Double Neg-
ation Shift (DNS). It is known that this schema characterises exactly the Kripke
frames for which every node is below a maximal node (see Gabbay [5]), so in par-
ticular it holds in every Kripke frame without infinite chains. We will show that
we can refute it in an interval of the hyperdoctrine of mass problems, even though
Theorem 7.6 does not apply.
Proposition 7.11. Let Σ be the language containing one unary relation R. There
is an interval [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM and a structure M in [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM such that M
refutes ∀x¬¬R(x)→ ¬¬∀xR(x).
Proof. We let K be the Kripke model based on the Kripke frame (ω,<), where n is
in the domain at m if and only if m ≥ n, and R(n) holds at m if and only if m > n.
Let everything be as in the proof of Theorem 7.4, except we change the definition
of A into: ⋃{(
C ({fi | i 6∈ X}) ∪ D
)
⊕X | X ∈ 2ω is infinite
}
,
where by X being infinite we mean that the subset X ⊆ ω represented by X is
infinite. We claim: α is still injective under this modified definition of A. Indeed,
assume that
A ≤M C({fi | i 6= j}) ∪ D,
say through Φe; we need to show that this still yields a contradiction. Let σ be the
least string such that the right half of Φe(σ) has a 1 at a position different from
j, say at position k; such a σ must exist since Φe(fj+1) ∈ A. Then Φe(σ
⌢fk) ∈
C({fi | i 6= k}) ∪ D, which is a contradiction.
All the other parts of the proof of Theorem 7.4 now go through as long as we
look at formulas not containing existential quantifiers. Since ∀x¬¬R(x) is intuition-
istically equivalent to ¬∃x¬R(x), we therefore see that
J∀x¬¬R(x)K ≡M B−1.
We claim: J¬∀x(R(x))K ≡M B−1, which is enough to prove the proposition. Note
that J∀x(R(x))K ≡M B−1⊕
⊕
m∈ω(Bm →M Bm+1). By introducing new predicates
Sm which hold if and only if m is in the domain and looking at JSm → Sm+1K, we
therefore get that J∀x(R(x))K ≡M
⊕
m∈ω Bm+1.
We claim that from every element g ∈
⊕
m∈ω Bm+1 we can uniformly compute
an element of A. In fact, we show how to uniformly compute from g a sequence
k0 < k1 < . . . such that g ∈ C({fi | i 6= kj}) ∪ D for every j ∈ ω; then if we let
X = {kj | j ∈ ω} we have g ⊕ X ∈
(
C({fi | i 6∈ X) ∪ D
)
⊕ X ⊆ A. For ease of
notation let k−1 = 0. We show how to compute ki+1 if ki is given. There are two
possibilities:
• The second bit of g[ki] is 0: take ki+1 to be the first bit of g[ki]; then
ki+1 > ki by the definition of Bki+1.
• The second bit of g[ki] is 1: then g[ki] computes an element of A and
therefore computes infinitely many j such that g[ki] ∈ C({fi | i 6= j}) ∪ D,
so take ki+1 to be such a j which is greater than ki. 
We do not know how to combine the proof of the last Proposition with the
proofs of Theorems 7.4 and 7.6, because it makes essential use of the fact that the
formula is refuted in a model on a frame which is a chain, and of the fact that the
subformulas containing universal quantifiers hold either everywhere or nowhere in
this model. Table 2 below summarises the positive results we know; however, this
characterisation is not complete.
Question 7.12. For which theories T is there an interval [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM and a
structure M in [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM such that the theory of M is exactly T ?
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Theorem Language Fragment Kripke frame condition
7.4 Arbitrary Full Decidable and no infinite chains
7.4 Arbitrary Existential Decidable
7.6 No functions Full No infinite chains
7.6 No functions Existential None
Table 2. Fragments of theories which have a structure in some
interval [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM , given their satisfiability by a certain kind
of Kripke frame.
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